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Abstract: "e Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical 
duplicates cannot di#er in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks (!$$%a, 
&''!), however, this thesis is false, since microphysical duplicates can di#er with 
respect to the intrinsic property of consciousness. In my view, Merricks’ argument is 
plausible, and extant attempts to reject it are problematic. However, the argument 
also threatens to make consciousness appear mysterious, by implying that conscious-
ness facts fail to be microphysically determined and that there can be brute and in-
explicable di#erences in consciousness between material things. "e paper therefore 
develops an account that can respect the soundness of Merricks’ argument while 
avoiding these problematic consequences. At the heart of the proposal is the idea that 
consciousness can be microphysically grounded despite failing to microphysical su-
pervene. "e proposed view also has the interesting consequence that consciousness 
is an intrinsic property despite depending on extrinsic factors for its instantiation. 
 
!  Introduction 
 
"e Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that the intrinsic properties of 
composite objects supervene on the intrinsic properties of, and interrelations be-
tween, their atomic proper parts. We can state a version of this thesis as follows:  
 
(MS) Necessarily, if a composite object, O, is composed of some atoms the XXs, 
and if O has intrinsic property F, then if there is an object, O*, composed 
of some atoms the YYs, and if the YYs have the same individual intrinsic 
properties and atom-to-atom relations as the XXs, then O* also has F.2 
 

1 Versions of the paper were presented to the Serious Metaphysics Group at Cambridge Uni-
versity and to the &'!( Metaphysical Mayhem conference at Rutgers University; thanks to all of 
the participants on those occasions. "anks especially to Ralf Bader, Dominic Alford-Duguid, Tim 
Crane, Ross Cameron, Clint Dowland, Nick Jones, Rae Langton, Mark Johnston, Hugh Mellor, 
Daniel Muñoz, Jonathan Scha#er, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Ted Sider, Aimee "omasson, Anna 
Quirk, Dean Zimmerman, and to two referees at Philosophical Studies. Some of the work for the 
paper was completed at Cambridge having received an Aristotelian Bursary from the Aristotelian 
Society, a Jacobsen Fellowship from the Royal Institute of Philosophy, and a Mind Studentship 
from the Mind Association. "e paper in its current form was written at Oxford as a Leverhulme 
Early Career Fellow. My thanks to all these institutions and funding bodies for their support. 
2 Note that we must restrict the intrinsic properties and atom-to-atom relations that we take 
into consideration if we are to avoid irrelevant and distracting counter-examples (cf. Merricks 
!$$%a: ($—('; Sider &''): !*'—!*!). Following Merricks (!$$%a), one option is to restrict our 
attention to just those intrinsic properties and interrelations that are pure and qualitative, and to all 
and only those atom-to-atom relations that are spatio-temporal and causal. One might also appeal 
to Lewisian perfectly natural properties and relations as in Gilmore (&'!': !%+). 
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Essentially, (MS) tells us that complex material objects with the same microphysical 
structure share their intrinsic properties. Without a di#erence in microphysical 
structure between two objects, there can be no di#erence in their intrinsic features. 
  (MS) is intuitively plausible. According to Merricks (!$$%a, &''!), however, 
it can be demonstrated that (MS) is false. In particular, Merricks claims that the 
property of consciousness provides a counter-example to (MS).3 "is property, 
Merricks claims, is an intrinsic property. Yet, it is also possible for two composite 
objects to di#er with respect to this property without di#ering in their microphys-
ical structure. "erefore, (MS) fails in its full generality. "ere is at least one intrin-
sic property, namely consciousness, that does not microphysically supervene.  
 I believe that Merricks’ argument against (MS) is compelling. However, the 
conclusion of the argument threatens to make consciousness mysterious, by imply-
ing that consciousness fails to be microphysically determined and that di#erences 
in consciousness between material objects can be brute and inexplicable (cf. section 
&). Accordingly, responses in the literature have focused on trying to undercut the 
argument, albeit in various costly ways (cf. Burke &''); Dorr &''); Hawley !$$%; 
Noonan !$$$; Sider &'')). By contrast, this paper develops a view that respects 
the soundness of the argument while avoiding the problematic consequences in-
volving consciousness that it seems to generate. My case depends on the idea that 
consistently with rejecting (MS), we can accept a related thesis, according to which 
the intrinsic properties of composite objects, including consciousness, are meta-
physically grounded in the properties and relations of their atomic proper parts. 
"e central aim of this paper, therefore, will be to explain how we can accept that 
the intrinsic properties of complex objects, including consciousness, can be micro-
physically grounded while also granting that Merricks’ case against (MS) succeeds.  
 Roadmap. "e next section sets out the argument against (MS). It then explains 
why the argument, if sound, threatens to make consciousness mysterious, before 
briefly criticising some extant attempts to show that the argument fails (section &). 
"e following sections then develop a view which grants the soundness of the ar-
gument while avoiding the result that consciousness fails to be microphysically de-
termined and that there can be brute di#erences in consciousness between material 
things (sections ) & *). "e final section of the paper concludes (section +). 
 
&  Against (MS) 
 
Let us stipulate that two composite objects are microphysical duplicates just in case 
their constituent atoms have all the same individual intrinsic properties and atom- 
to-atom relations.4 Merricks’ argument against (MS) can then be stated as follows: 

3 Note that no particular conception of consciousness is required for the argument to work. 
4 Microphysical duplicates in this sense will share all and only those of their microphysical 
properties that are intrinsic, i.e. those that are a function of what their constituent atom are intrin-
sically like. Later on, however, we will have cause to distinguish between objects that are 
 ) 
 
!. It is possible for microphysical duplicates to di#er in consciousness.   
&.  Being conscious is an intrinsic property. 
 It is possible for microphysical duplicates di#er in intrinsic properties.  
). If (MS) is true, it is not possible for microphysical duplicates to di#er in intrin-
sic properties.  
 (MS) is false. 
 
"e argument is valid. Premise )., moreover, follows straightforwardly from (MS). 
"e main premises in the argument, therefore, are premises !. and &.  
To argue for premise !., Merricks reasons as follows. Consider two human per-
sons, Mary and Martha. We can suppose that these beings are microphysical du-
plicates in the intended sense.5 We can then suppose that Mary loses her left foot. 
As a result, Mary will cease to be a microphysical duplicate of Martha, and will 
come to be microphysical duplicate of some undetached proper part of Martha, 
namely, that part comprising all of Martha besides her left foot. Call that unde-
tached part ‘Martha-Minus’.6 "e case for premise !. is now quite simple. We can 
suppose that Mary is conscious. But we also know that Martha-Minus is not con-
scious, because we know that in general, the proper parts of persons are not con-
scious. Moreover, if Martha-Minus were conscious, then by parity of reasoning, we 
could show that Martha contains a multitude of conscious beings within her bor-
ders. After all, Martha contains various large proper parts that are just like Martha-
Minus, and we could run a version of the argument for each one of them. Gener-
alising, we could then show that each one of us contains vastly many conscious 
beings within our boundaries. "is conclusion, however, is absurd. We do not each 
contain manifold conscious beings within our boundaries. As Merricks (!$$%a: ()) 
writes, ‘there is not a mighty host of conscious, reflective, pain- and pleasure-feeling 
objects now sitting in my chair, now wearing my shirt, now thinking about this 
paper’. We must deny, therefore, that Martha-Minus is conscious. But then, given 
that Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical duplicates, this means we have to 

microphysical duplicates in this restricted sense, and objects that are microphysical duplicates sim-
pliciter, i.e. that share all of their microphysical properties both intrinsic and extrinsic (cf. section * 
below). 
5 I assume, with Merricks, that human persons are composite material objects of some sort. 
"roughout, I will write as if we human persons are whole-bodied human beings. However, nothing 
really turs on that being so. It is enough for us to be complex material things of one sort or another. 
For example, as a referee points out, we might even be brains of human beings or other such parts. 
(Any view that Zimmerman calls ‘sensible materialism would do. As long as humans are complex 
wholes and natural kinds with plausible maximality constraints on their instantiation, both Mer-
ricks’ argument as well as my own reply is going to go through. Not having to commit myself to 
the idea that human persons are any one type of complex whole is thus in fact all to the good.) 
6 It is irrelevant to argue that this kind of case is nomologically impossible. "e case need only 
be metaphysically possible, and this seems hard to deny (cf. Merricks !$$%a: (*—(+). 
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grant that two material objects could be microphysical duplicates while di#ering in 
terms of consciousness. But that, of course, is just to say that premise ! is true.    
What then of premise &., the claim that consciousness is an intrinsic property? 
Merricks argues for this premise by noting that consciousness bears the ‘mark’ of 
an intrinsic property, insofar as it could be instantiated by a lonely being. He writes: 
 
Consider the fact that most theists believe that God might never have created; they 
believe there is a possible world that contains only God. "is implies that there is a 
possible world that contains just a single conscious entity. "is implication is coher-
ent; at least, it is not rendered incoherent by the nature of being conscious. If it were, 
presumably, someone would have developed an argument for atheism along these 
lines. (Contrast this implication with the claim that there is a possible world that 
contains just a single entity, three feet from a dog.) If you don't have a taste for 
theology, consider the solipsistic hypothesis that I—a conscious entity—am all that 
exists. While surely false, this hypothesis is not rendered incoherent simply by the 
nature of being conscious. So being conscious bears the “mark” of being intrinsic. An 
object’s being conscious does not require that no other objects exist nor is it rooted 
in the past or the future. Being conscious is an intrinsic property. (!$$%a: (!—(&) 
 
Not every property that is instantiable by a lonely being is intrinsic. For example, 
the property of being lonely is itself (in)famously non-intrinsic. However, if a prop-
erty is instantiable by a lonely being, then either that property is intrinsic or else its 
instantiation depends on certain negative factors, such as the absence of certain 
further objects, or else on what is going on at other times. Yet, consciousness is 
intuitively not like this. Rather, the more natural thought is that being conscious 
is intrinsic. As Ralf Bader explains, when discussing Merricks’ argument,  
 
Intuitively…consciousness is an intrinsic matter. To find out whether x is conscious 
we have only have to look at x…what happens elsewhere is not of any relevance to 
the question whether x instantiates the property of being conscious (manuscript-a: 
!$) 
 
"ere is a strong initial case, therefore, for thinking that consciousness is an intrin-
sic property. But if that is right, then premise &. is sound. Given, therefore, that we 
also have reason to think premise !. is sound, there is a case for thinking that Mer-
ricks’ argument against (MS) goes through. Consciousness fails to microphysically 
supervene, and, therefore, it follows that (MS) is false.  
 Suppose that Merricks’ argument is sound. What follows? One way to make 
progress with that question is to consider the motivations for (MS) in the first place. 
According to Ted Sider (&'')), the reason to accept (MS) is that it captures, or 
flows from, the plausible thought that macrophysical phenomena are in general 
metaphysically determined, and therefore explained, by microphysical phenomena:  
 
Why accept supervenience on the small? Because of the unrivaled success of the phys-
ics of the small. Physics and related disciplines have been so successful at explaining 
 + 
macroscopic phenomena that it would take a very powerful argument indeed to un-
dermine our faith in this principle. (&''): !*') 
 
One might, therefore, reason from the falsity of (MS) to a failure of microphysical 
determination. If Merricks’ argument is sound, then consciousness fails to micro-
physically supervene. Failure of supervenience, however, implies a failure of meta-
physical determination. "erefore, Merricks’ argument has the radical consequence 
that consciousness facts fail to be determined by underlying microphysical facts (cf. 
Dorr &''): ,!&).  
 Notably, this is a conclusion that Merricks himself seems to embrace (see esp. 
Merricks &''!: Ch. *). In his view, consciousness is an emergent property of per-
sons, and the consciousness facts ‘float free’ of the underlying microphysical facts. 
Many of us, however, will be unhappy with this conclusion. After all, many of us 
accept precisely the kind of microphysicalist picture that Sider gestures at above, 
and so will baulk at the idea that consciousness fails to be microphysically deter-
mined. If this is the upshot of Merricks’ argument, therefore, one might conclude 
that the argument must be flawed, and seek some way of pushing back. 
 "ere is a further apparent consequence of the argument that might make us 
want to resist its conclusion, namely, that there can be brute and inexplicable dif-
ferences in consciousness between material things. Consider again Mary and Mar-
tha-Minus. "ese beings are microphysical duplicates. But one of them, namely 
Mary, is conscious, while the other, Martha-Minus, is not. But what could explain 
this? According to Merricks (!$$%b: %+), the di#erence is simply ‘mysterious’. One 
might worry, therefore, that Merricks’ argument against (MS), if sound, not only 
forces us to accept not only that consciousness is an emergent property that fails to 
be microphysically determined, but also that material objects can di#er in con-
sciousness without there being any explanation as to why these di#erences obtain. 
 In short, while Merricks’ argument against (MS) may seem initially compelling, 
it also threatens to make consciousness mysterious. One might, therefore, think 
that the right reaction is to find a way of showing that the argument is flawed. 
 It is far from clear, however, if there is a plausible way to reject the argument. 
Granting that persons are material objects, and that we do not each contain mani-
fold conscious proper parts within our borders, there are two main options for 
pushing back: one can deny that person-parts such as Martha-Minus actually exist, 
or one can deny that consciousness is intrinsic.7  Yet, both these options have costs. 

7 One could deny that persons are material objects without embracing dualism, e.g. by claiming 
that persons are events constituted by material goings-on. Robinson (&''() argues that such a move 
could help undermine Merricks’ argument; however, see Kovacs (&'!') for important criticism of 
this idea. As for the view that each of us contains manifold conscious proper parts, I grant that some 
philosophers might not be unhappy with such a view. In my view, however, this position is very 
hard to take seriously (for persuasive argument against this kind of view see Olson !$$+). It also 
generates various important ethical puzzles and paradoxes (cf. Johnston &'!(; Unger &''*, &''(). 
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 "e first option is to embrace a restricted view of composition according to 
which human persons do not have large proper parts like Martha-Minus in the first 
place (cf. Olson !$$+, van Inwagen !$%!). For, if there are no such person-parts, 
then the argument for premise !. is undermined, since it can no longer be shown 
that a person and a proper part thereof might di#er in consciousness despite being 
microphysical duplicates. "is move, however, requires us to deny, not only that 
certain unfamiliar parts of persons such as Martha-Minus exist, but also that such 
familiar parts as heads and hands exist. For, first, we could run a version of the 
argument against (MS) by focusing on these more familiar parts (cf. Burke &'')). 
But also, second, it would be intolerably arbitrary to deny that “foot-complements” 
like Martha-Minus exist while insisting that there are such things as heads and 
hands (Olson !$$+). Accordingly, the eliminativist option forces us to make the 
unfortunate claim that certain familiar objects from our everyday ontology do not 
exist, namely, familiar person-parts like heads and hands and upper-halves.  
"e second option is to maintain that consciousness is extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic (Burke &''); Hawley !$$%; Noonan !$$$; Sider &'')). "e main prob-
lem here, however, is that this move conflicts with our intuitive conception of con-
sciousness as an intrinsic property. As we said above, it is natural to think that 
consciousness is intrinsic, and it would be surprising if this turned out not to be so. 
As John Hawthorne explains, in a related context:  
 
Granted, there are on occasion surprising discoveries of extrinsically…Yet it seems 
especially di-cult to imagine becoming convinced that consciousness is extrinsic. 
(&''(: n. !') 
  
In short, we intuitively think of consciousness as being intrinsic, not extrinsic. 
Whether a being is conscious, whether it has a subjective mental life, depends only 
on what that thing is like in and of itself. Rejecting this conception of consciousness 
is not incoherent. But the move is costly, and this should be acknowledged.8 (Cf. 
Bader manuscript; Merricks !$$%b, &''!: Ch. * for further criticism of this view.) 

8 What about extrinsic mental properties (involving, for example, “wide” intentional content)? 
My own view is that if there are such properties, then this shows that consciousness is a “hybrid” 
property that can be had both intrinsically and extrinsically (cf. Bader &'!) for discussion of such 
“hybrid” properties). So long as consciousness can be had intrinsically, however, the central argu-
ments of this paper will remain substantially the same (though we would need to make appropriate 
changes to (MS) and to the thesis I will later refer to as (MG), so that the focus is on properties that 
are had intrinsically rather than properties that are intrinsic). For ease of presentation, I will con-
tinue to focus on the idea that consciousness is intrinsic. But those who think there are extrinsic 
mental properties should keep in mind that we could easily retreat to the very plausible, though 
somewhat weaker, idea that that consciousness can be had intrinsically (which would follow from 
there being at least some mental properties that are intrinsic). Cf. Merricks (!$$%a: (!, fn. (). 
But there are two further points to make. (!) Some mental properties may be ‘wide’ without 
thereby being extrinsic. And perhaps these are the only such properties we should grant. And (&) 
even if some properties are wide and thus extrinsic, they may not be conscious in the sense needed 
to generate the kind of worries about overpopulation of phenomenally conscious beings that Mer-
ricks is concerned with. Both points are plausible, and would of course grist to my mill.  
 , 
"ese points, of course, are not decisive. However, enough has been said to 
motivate the project I wish to pursue.9 For what I want to do, in this paper, is 
develop an account that respects the soundness of Merricks’ argument against 
(MS), while avoiding the problematic consequences concerning consciousness that 
it has plausibly been taken to imply. On the one hand, the account I want to de-
velop will allow us to respect the intuitive status of consciousness as intrinsic, with-
out forcing us to deny that human persons have large proper parts. On the other 
hand, however, it will enable us to avoid thinking of consciousness as mysterious. 
Accordingly, the view developed here will allow us to respect what is right about 
Merricks’ case against (MS), without having to accept the troublesome conse-
quences relating to consciousness that many commentators have taken Merricks’ 
argument against (MS) to imply. At the same time, it will avoid the pitfalls associ-
ated with the extant responses to Merrick’s argument that we canvassed above. 
At the heart of the proposed account is the idea that consciousness can be mi-
crophysically grounded even if it fails to microphysically supervene. In the next 
section, therefore, I will begin by introducing that idea. I then develop an account 
that allows us to make good sense of this position. On the resulting view, con-
sciousness is fully grounded in the microphysical, despite failing to microphysically 
supervene. Moreover, di#erences in consciousness between persons and microphys-
ically identical person-parts turn out to be fully explicable rather than being brute.   
 
)  Grounding without supervenience  
 
Consider the following principle, formulated not in terms of supervenience, but 
rather in terms of the distinct notion of metaphysical grounding and “in virtue of”: 
 
(MG) If a composite object, O, has some intrinsic property, F, then O has F 
in virtue of having some microphysical property G (where having G is 
a matter of being composed of some atoms exemplifying certain intrin-
sic properties and/or standing in certain atom-to-atom relations).  
 

9 For further helpful discussion of the options for responding to Merricks’ argument see Kovacs 
(&'!'). 
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Essentially, this principle is the ground-theoretic analogue of Microphysical Super-
venience (MS).10 We can refer to it, therefore, as Microphysical Grounding (MG).11  
 Now, (MS) and (MG) are distinct theses.12 However, it would be strange to 
believe in (MS) without believing in (MG). After all, supervenience claims like 
(MS) are often put forward precisely because one takes a grounding thesis such as 
(MG) to hold. As Bader (&'!,: !!+) writes, “grounding relations are precisely the 
kinds of explanatory relations that supervenience relations are meant to model and 
in terms of which supervenience claims can ultimately be explained and justified”. 
"at said, even if those tempted by (MS) will be similarly tempted by (MG), it 
does not yet follow that advocates of (MG) must accept (MS). Indeed, I will be 
arguing in what follows that we can accept (MG) consistently with rejecting (MS) 
for precisely the reasons Merricks gives. Developing this view will then provide us 
with a way of granting Merricks’ argument against (MS) while avoiding the prob-
lematic consequences pertaining to consciousness that it appears to generate.  
 Let me begin by sketching the bare outlines of the view. We can focus on the 
case of Mary and Martha-Minus. Mary is a person, and Martha-Minus is a person-
part. In particular, Martha is a proper part of the distinct human person Martha. 
Moreover, Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical duplicates, in that the atoms 
composing Mary are just like the atoms composing Martha-Minus in terms of their 
individual intrinsic properties and their atom-to-atom relations. Since I grant that 
Merricks’ argument against (MS) is sound, I accept the following four claims: 
 
 [!] Mary is conscious. 
 [&] Martha-Minus is not conscious. 

10 One might think that a more precise analogue principle would involve an “inter-object” 
rather than an “intra-object” grounding claim, i.e. something along the following lines: 
 
(MG*) If an object, O, is composed of some atoms, the XXS, and if O has some intrinsic 
property, F, then O has F in virtue of the fact that the XXS are G*, where for the XXs to be G* 
is for them to instantiate certain intrinsic properties and/or stand in certain interrelations. 
 
Interesting questions arise about the precise relationship between (MG) and (MG*), though here is 
not the place to pursue them. I choose to focus on (MG) in the present paper primarily for ease of 
presentation, and I doubt that much of great importance turns upon this choice. For discussion of 
a principle very much like (MG*) and of a puzzle it gives rise to, see [omitted].  
11 For an introduction to the relevant notion of metaphysical grounding see Audi (&'!&); Fine 
(&'!&); Rosen (&'!'); and Scha#er (&''$), among many others. "ere are many controversies 
about the precise nature of metaphysical grounding, but we do not need to engage with these here. 
What I have in mind is a relation of metaphysical determination that is hyperintensional in charac-
ter and that has certain distinctive formal characteristics, namely it is asymmetric, irreflexive and 
transitive. I assume that grounding claims in general be expressed by the ‘in virtue of’ locution.  
12 "is flows from the fact that grounding and supervenience are distinct relations with di#erent 
characters. Cf. Scha#er (&'!,: !'): ‘With supervenience, one simply has two families of properties, 
and one can only ask whether or not they modally co-vary. With grounding, one has a relation of 




 [)] Consciousness is an intrinsic property. 
 [*] Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical duplicates.  
 
What Merricks’ argument e#ectively brings out is that these four claims jointly 
imply that (MS) is false. What I want to say, however, is that despite this, we can 
nonetheless hold all of these claims consistently with accepting (MG). To help 
bring out the details of the view, it will be useful to consider a fairly immediate 
problem that arises if we try to accept (MG) consistently with claims [!]—[*].  
If (MG) is true, then [!] and [)] jointly imply the following, namely, that there 
is some microphysical property, M, such that Mary is conscious in virtue of having 
this property—whereby having M is a matter of being composed of some atoms 
with certain intrinsic properties and/or certain interrelations. "us we obtain: 
 
 [+] Mary is conscious in virtue of instantiating M. 
 
By [*], however, we know that Martha-Minus also instantiates microphysical prop-
erty. And yet by [&], we know that Martha-Minus is not conscious for that reason. 
"e view I wish to hold, therefore, implies that while Mary and Martha-Minus 
both instantiate the same consciousness-making microphysical property M, only 
Mary is conscious for this reason. In other words, as well as [+], we must also accept: 
 
 [(] Martha-Minus also instantiates M, but is not conscious for that reason.  
 
If it is coherent to hold both [+] and [(], then we can hold a view on which con-
sciousness facts are microphysically grounded despite failing to microphysically su-
pervene. Whenever a person is conscious, she will be conscious in virtue of certain 
underlying microphysical properties. Moreover, this will be the case despite the fact 
that certain microphysically identical person-parts, who share those same con-
sciousness-making microphysical properties, are not themselves conscious. A per-
son and a person-part might therefore share the same consciousness-making mi-
crophysical properties, and yet only the person will be conscious in virtue of having 
them. Clearly, this promises a way of accepting Merricks’ argument against (MS) 
without having to deny that consciousness is microphysically determined, and 
hence without having to view consciousness as a mysterious emergent property.  
 "ere is, however, an important question as to whether it really is coherent to 
maintain both [+] and [(]. "e trouble is that these two claims jointly imply the 
falsity of an initially attractive principle governing the grounding relation, to the 
e#ect that grounding relations are fully general in character (so that if a is F in 
virtue of being G, then any possible b that is G must be F for that reason). In the 
next sub-section, I will set out this worry, and then develop a response. "is will 
help draw out further important details of the view that I wish to defend. 
  
 !' 
).! Rejecting Generality  
 
Consider the following principle, which we can refer to as: 
 
 Generality(F) (G) (x) (Gx <g Fx)   (y) ((Gy  (Gy <g Fy)) 
 
Reading “<g” as “grounds”, the principle tells us that if something is F in virtue of 
being G, then, necessarily, anything that is G is F in virtue of being G. "at is, 
whenever the fact that x is G makes it the case that x is F, it follows that if any 
possible object y is G, the fact that y is G will make it the case that y is F.13 
"e principle is intuitively plausible. As Gideon Rosen explains: 
 
If Fred is handsome in virtue of his symmetrical features and deep green eyes, then 
anyone with a similar face would have to be handsome for the same reason. Particular 
grounding facts must always be subsumable under general laws, or so it seems. (&'!': 
!)&) 
 
"e main idea is that grounding claims are fully general in character. When some-
thing is F in virtue of being G, this means that across the board, things that are G 
are F for that reason. As Audi (&'!&: !'*) puts it, the intuition is that grounding 
relations “do not vary from instance to instance of the properties involved in the 
facts in question”, and that, likewise, “they do not vary from world to world”.14 
 If Generality is true, it is not possible to hold both [+] and [(] at once, con-
trary to what I want to say. For suppose that [+] is true. By Generality, it then 
follows that any object whatsoever that has microphysical property M must be con-
scious for that reason. Yet, given [+], this is incompatible with [(], the claim that 
Martha-Minus also instantiates M, and yet fails to be conscious in virtue of having 
it.15 

13 Cf. the principle Rosen (&'!+) dubs ‘Weak Formality’. (For the stronger ‘Formality’ princi-
ple, see Rosen &'!'). We find a very similar generality principle discussed in Audi (&'!&: !o)-!'*). 
For general critique of the principle see Moran (&'!%).  
14 Note that the truth of Generality would also help to explain why a related principle is true, 
which, following deRossett (&'!'), we can refer to as the Determination Constraint. "is tells 
us that if something is F in virtue of being G, then, necessarily, anything that’s F is G. As Wilsch 
(&'!+) explains, this principle is very plausible, but also needs explaining. "e thing to note is that 
if Generality is true, this would explain the principle in a straightforward way. For, given that 
ground is factive, Generality straightforwardly implies the Determination Constraint.  
15 Notice that to generate the worry here, standard grounding necessitation principles will not 
do. Standard such principles say that if a is F in virtue of being G then necessarily if a is G then a is 
F. ("ey concern, therefore, only one object: if it is F in virtue of being G, then necessarily, when 
it is G, it is F.) But [+] and [(] only seem inconsistent if we have a principle concerning not just 
what happens when both (i) a is F in virtue of being G in the actual world and (ii) a is G in other 
worlds (namely whether x is also G in that world), but rather than (i) a is F in virtue of being G in 
the actual world and (ii) for any whatsoever if that x is F in any other world (namely whether x is 
also G in that world). "is is why we must appeal to Generality to generate the argument and not 
to a more standard necessitation principle, even though contingent grounding (which I bring in 
 !! 
 In order to have a coherent view, therefore, we need a way of rejecting Gener-
ality. In particular, we need a way of claiming that while Mary is conscious in 
virtue of having M, and while Martha-Minus also has M, Martha-Minus is not 
conscious for that reason. My goal will be to develop precisely such an account. 
 To begin, consider the following further passage from Rosen (&'!+), this time 
expressing scepticism about Generality. According to Rosen, this principle: 
 
…is not self-evident. It amounts to the claim that when a grounds Fa in some 
particular case, the capacity of the first fact to ground the second derives entirely 
from the distinctive powers of the predicable , and not from the combination of  
and a together. But why shouldn’t there be cases in which  and a conspire to make 
the case that Fa, in part thanks to  and its distinctive powers, but also in part thanks 
to a and its distinctive powers? (&'!+: !$$)  
 
"ere is a lot that we might take from this passage. For present purposes, however, 
I wish to focus just on the following point. As I see it, Rosen is making room for 
the possibility that there could be two objects, a and b, such that although a and b 
are both G, only a is F for that reason. "e idea, moreover, is that the reason only 
a gets to be F in virtue of being G is to some di#erence in nature between the 
objects a and b themselves. "at is, the idea is that there is some di#erence that 
obtains between a and b, such that because of this di#erence, while both objects 
instantiate the same grounding property G, only a instantiates the grounded prop-
erty F for that reason. 
 One plausible way—though not the only such way—to develop this thought is 
to appeal to the idea that di#erences in kind can make for di#erences in what 
grounding relations a thing can enter into. It is natural to think that certain prop-
erties can be instantiated only by certain kinds of thing.16 If that is right, however, 

later) is indeed standardly and in the first instance seen as challenging grounding as a necessitating 
relation.  
Granted, to reject the idea that just because Mary is conscious in virtue of having M, then 
necessarily if Mary has M, then she is conscious for that reason, we do not need to reject General-
ity, but rather only a more standard ground-theoretic necessitation principle e.g. such that if a is F 
in virtue of being G then necessarily if a is G then a is F (in virtue of being F).  However, if what 
we want to reject is not just the idea that because Mary is conscious in virtue of having M, then 
necessarily, whenever Mary herself has M, she is conscious for that reason, but rather that whenever 
Mary is conscious in virtue of having M, then necessarily if any object whatsoever has M, then that 
thing is conscious for that reason, (and note that is the thought we want to deny in allowing that 
[+] and [(] might be true at once), what needs denying is Generality and the association Deter-
mination Constraint (and note again that the former entails the latter given the factivity of 
ground. Cf. fn. !) above.) 
 
 
16 "is is especially plausible on the kind of neo-Aristotelian metaphysical picture that draws a 
sharp distinction between what an object is on the one hand, and merely how it is on the other. On 
this view, to say what an object is, one has to specify the kind of thing it is. Whereas to specify how 
it is, one has to list its properties/relations. A crucial part of the picture is that in a certain sense, the 
kind of thing an object is classifies as prior to what properties it has: being the kind of thing it is 
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then we can well imagine cases of the following general sort. We have two objects, 
a and b, and these are di#erent kinds of thing. In particular, a is the kind of thing 
that can be F, while b is not. We then suppose it happens that both a and b instan-
tiate the same base property, G. Since a is the kind of thing that can be F, we can 
allow that a is F in virtue of being G, i.e. that in the case of a, being G makes for 
being F. But we can also claim that b will not be F in virtue of being G, despite 
being G—the explanation being that since b isn’t the kind of object that can be F 
in the first place, it is not the kind of object that can be F in virtue of being G. So 
here we have a case in which, just as Rosen supposes in the above passage, two 
objects share the same grounding property G, and yet only one of them gets to be 
F for that reason, whereby this is due to a prior di#erence in nature between them, 
and in particular, due to the fact that they are di#erent kinds of thing. 
 On this view, then, the kind of thing an object is can determine the range of 
properties that it can have, and, hence, the range of grounding relations that it can 
enter into. One might ask, however, what role exactly kinds are playing here. To 
have a counter-example to Generality, we need a case in which a is F fully and 
solely in virtue of being G, while b is G but fails to be F for that reason. So, we 
cannot incorporate the role of kinds by treating them as partial grounds. "at is, 
the view cannot be that when a is F, a is F partly in virtue of being G and partly in 
virtue of being the kind of thing it is. How, then, are we to model the role that 
kind-facts are playing in the story? If kinds are not partial grounds, what are they? 
"ere are, it seems to me, various avenues we might pursue here. My preferred 
option, however, is to appeal to the machinery of “conditional grounding”. In the 
causation literature, a distinction is sometimes drawn between causes and condi-
tions. "e idea is that in some cases, an event c will only cause some further event 
e given that certain background conditions {X} are met. "e background condi-
tions, moreover, are not construed as partial causes. Rather, they are that which 
enables the cause to act as a cause in the first place and to perform its causal work. 
Now I believe that we can also draw a similar distinction in the case of ground. 
"at is, we can maintain that in some cases, one fact  grounds a further fact . 
only given that certain background conditions {C} are met. "ese conditions, 
moreover, are not to be taken as further partial grounds. Rather,  is to be con-
ceived as fully grounding ., and the role of the conditions is that of enabling  to 
act as a ground of . in the first place, i.e. to enable  to perform its grounding 
work in making it the case that .. On this kind of view, then, as Kit Fine (&'!+: 
)!!) puts it, “[c]ertain conditions may provide a background to other conditions 
having a determinative role even though they do not themselves play a determina-
tive role”. In other words, as Bader (manuscript-b: *) writes, “[n]ot everything that 
plays a role in making it the case that something else is the case needs to play a 

determines the range of features it can have, and so in this sense, what the object is determines how 
it can be. For a recent defence of this kind of picture see Wiggins (&''!); cf. also Moran (&'!%).  
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grounding-role”, since “[t]hings can also be relevant by being conditions that must 
be satisfied in order for other things to do their grounding work”.17   
 "e idea that we can distinguish between grounds and conditions in this way 
has been appealed to in several di#erent contexts in the recent metaphysics litera-
ture.18 But it is worth saying a little more about it. As I understand it the distinction 
is robust and not at all contextual as we sometimes find in the analogous causation 
case (cf. Bader &'!+). A ground Gx is a property-instantiation in virtue of which 
some other property-instantiation Fx exists. A condition, by contrast, is that which 
enables Gx to do its work in making it the case that F is instantiated by x. "e point 
is nicely brought out by Ralf Bader in the following passage: 
 
To make sense of the notion of conditional grounding…we need to distinguish be-
tween the ground or the source of the property and the condition of the possession 
of the property. In cases of conditional grounding the things that must be the case 
for x to F…can be distinguished into those that determine x’s Fness (its conditional 
grounds) and those on which c’s Fness merely depends (its conditions). Put di#er-
ently, we ca di#erentia those features that are the source of x’s Fness from those that 
are the condition of x’s Fness. On the one hand, we have that in virtue of which. Is 
F, namely the ground of x’s being F< the source of x’s Fness. On the other, we have 
that on condition of which x is F, namely the condition of x’s being, that on which 
x’s Fness merely depends. (Bader manuscript-b: *) 
 
Note also that when x is F in virtue of being G given that some condition C is met, 
then the condition being met is an enabler on x being F in virtue of being G. Again, 
the idea is that the condition being met (or not) enables (or disables) the grounding 
property to do its grounding work in making the grounded property instantiated.  
 More could be said, of course, about the ground/condition distinction. And I 
do say more about it elsewhere, as do others (cf. fn. !,). What I want to do pres-
ently, however, rather than elucidate further the notion of conditional grounding 

17 Note, then, that the distinction between grounds and conditions is meant to be metaphysi-
cally robust. In the causation literature, it is common to deflate the analogous causes/conditions 
distinction, arguing that what counts as a cause and what as a background conditions can depend 
on contextual matters. "e view I have in mind here, however, which distinguishes grounds and 
conditions, implies a robust distinction between the things that are grounds and the things that are 
enabling conditions which is not context-sensitive in this way. (For a defence of the idea that we 
can draw a metaphysically robust distinction between grounds/conditions see Bader &'!+.) 
18 For example, Fine (&'!+, &'!() argues that we need to make use of conditional grounding 
in order to properly model the role that the existence of facts play with respect to the holding of 
diachronic identities. Meanwhile, Ralf Bader (manuscriptb) and Ted Sider (&'&') argue (inde-
pendently) that we should appeal to conditional grounding (which Sider refers to as ‘grounding
qua’) in order to handle the problem of truthgrounding universal generalisations. Moran (&'!%) 
has put the view to work in the context of dealing with the problem of coinciding objects. And 
Bader (&'!+) has argued that we need the notion of conditional grounding in order to properly 
model the way in which reasons can vary across contexts (cf. Dancy &''*; Ch. )). "e notion of 
conditional grounding is also somewhat similar to the notion of an ‘anchor’ in Epstein (&'!+), due 
to the fact that anchors are not grounds but rather that which enables other things to do their 
grounding work.  
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that has already been explored elsewhere, is show that if we help ourselves to this 
machinery, then we can make good sense of the idea that kind-di#erences between 
objects can make for di#erences in terms of the grounding relations they can enter 
into. On such a view, there can be cases where an object, a, is F in virtue of being 
G, but only given that it meets the background condition of being a certain kind 
of thing. Being that kind of thing is therefore not a ground of being F for that 
object. Rather, being that kind of thing is what enables the object to be F in virtue 
of being G. And so if some other object, b, could instantiate G without being the 
kind of thing that can be F, we would have a counter-example to Generality. One 
object, a, would be F in virtue of being G, conditional on being a certain kind of 
thing. "e other object, b, would then be G without being F. Due to being the 
wrong kind of thing, the fact that b is G would fail to make it so that b is F. 
 At this point, we are in a position to explain how [+] and [(] might both be 
true, i.e. how it could be the case that while Mary is conscious in virtue of having 
M, Martha-Minus also has M but fails to be conscious for that reason. All we need 
is the further idea that Mary and Martha-Minus di#er in kind, and that this di#er-
ence makes it so that Mary is able to be conscious while Martha-Minus is not. In 
other words, we need to claim that while human persons like Mary are the kind of 
thing that can be conscious, mere person-parts like Martha-Minus are not. For 
what we can then say is this. When Mary is conscious, she is conscious in virtue of 
having microphysical property M. However, she is conscious in virtue of having M 
only given that she meets a certain background condition, namely, that of being a 
certain kind of thing. Martha-Minus, however, is not the kind of thing that can be 
conscious. So, while Martha-Minus also has M, she fails to be conscious for that 
reason. "at is, both Mary and Martha-Minus have the same (conditionally) con-
sciousness-making microphysical property M. But only Mary is conscious in virtue 
of having this property. And this is due to a prior di#erence in kind between them. 
 Is it plausible to think that a di#erence in kind between Mary and Martha-
Minus could help to explain why only one of them gets to be conscious in virtue 
of having the shared microphysical property M? "ere are, I think, grounds for 
answering a-rmatively. One plausible thought, for example, is that in general, be-
ing a person is a background condition on being conscious.19,20 Plausibly, however, 
only Mary meets this condition. Perhaps Martha-Minus belongs to the kind Aggre-
gate, or Mere Sum. But plausibly, Martha-Minus, unlike Mary, is not a person. 
Accordingly, there is a case for thinking that we can locate a di#erence in kind 
between Mary and Martha-Minus, and more generally between persons and the 

19 Shoemaker (&''%) develops this view by claiming that persons persist by psychological con-
tinuity, and that persisting in this way is necessary for being conscious.  
20 Importantly, for the view that personhood is a condition on consciousness to be at all plau-
sible, we need a weightier conception of personhood than the standard neo-Lockean conception, 
on which being a person is just a matter of being a self-conscious entity. Rather, we need to view 
persons as a distinctive kind of thing, whereby being this kind of thing is a precondition for con-
sciousness. Cf. Bader (manuscript-a: fn. (). 
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large proper parts thereof, that will allow us to maintain, in the manner sketched 
above, that even when a person and a person-part share the same consciousness-
making microphysical properties, only the person will be conscious for that reason. 
 Note that this is just one way of developing the kind of view that I am interested 
in defending. "ere are also further options. For instance, one might think that 
Mary is most fundamentally an animal, but that Martha-Minus is not. One might 
then claim that (at least when it comes to material objects) being an animal is a 
background condition on being conscious, and hence on being conscious in virtue 
of having the relevant base properties.21 Another option is to focus on the kind of 
thing that person-parts like Martha-Minus are. Again, perhaps such parts are ag-
gregates of matter. Moreover, it is plausible to think that mere aggregates of matter 
are not the kind of thing that can be conscious. So, we might adopt a view on 
which Mary would be conscious in virtue of having M, because whatever kind of 
thing she is, we know that since she is a person she’s the kind of thing that can be 
conscious, while, Martha-Minus, as a mere aggregate of matter, would fail to be 
conscious in virtue of having M, due to being the wrong kind of thing.22 
 "ere is a way, therefore, to maintain [+] and [(] at once, and to reject the 
Generality thesis in a principled manner. In particular, we can appeal to a di#er-
ence in kind between Mary and Martha-Minus in order to make sense of the idea 
that while Mary is conscious in virtue of having M, Martha-Minus is not.23 In turn, 
this allows us to embrace a view that is consistent with (MG) but not (MS). On 
that view, microphysical duplicates can di#er in consciousness, and so (MS) is false. 
But consciousness is nonetheless microphysically determined. For when a person 
is conscious, she is conscious in virtue of her microphysical properties. It is just that 
the grounding relation only holds given that the person is the kind of thing she is. 
Because the person is the kind of thing she is, she meets a background condition 

21 For this suggestion see Ayers (!$($: $%—$$): “[I]t is at least a philosophical possibility, and 
by no means contrary to common sense or to science, that any experience is necessarily the experi-
ence of an animal…”. I take up this idea in more detail in [omitted].  
22 In this second case, rather than Mary meeting a condition that enables her to be conscious 
in virtue of having M, Martha-Minus meets a condition that disables her from being conscious for 
that reason. But the crucial di#erence between Mary and Martha-Minus is still a di#erence in kind. 
23 Instead of appealing to a di#erence in kind, we might instead appeal to other resources. For 
instance, we might appeal to a di#erence in essence between persons or person-parts, or to a di#er-
ence in form. Insofar as it is plausible to view the kind, or essence, or form…etc. of an object as 
able to determine the range of properties a thing can have, we could appeal to any such a di#erence 
in order to o#er a structurally similar account to the one that I have sketched in the main text. So 
even those unsympathetic to the neo-Aristotelian metaphysic sketched above could still endorse a 
version of the general view I wish to hold, on which we can accept (MG) while rejecting (MS).   
We might also simply impose maximality as the condition that the person must meet in order 
to be conscious. "at is, rather than requiring that the person be this or that kind, we just say that 
to be conscious x must be a maximal whole. My own view, however, which I lack space to develop 
here, is that kinds, if treated su-ciently robustly (as described in fn. !+) are much better to play the 
role of the kind of condition on consciousness that I have in mind. Part of the reason here is that I 
think we can explain plausibly why kinds are maximal (cf. section *) and then appeal to kinds as 
plausible conditions on consciousness. To pursue the other strategy, however, one would have to 
argue that maximality is itself a condition on consciousness, which seems to me harder to do. 
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that enables her to be conscious in virtue of having certain microphysical proper-
ties. "e person-part, however, is a di#erent kind of thing, and fails to meet the 
requisite background condition. And so, despite having the same microphysical 
properties, the person-part is not conscious in virtue of instantiating them. 
 Note that this view also enables us to avoid saying that di#erences in conscious-
ness between persons and person-parts that are microphysical duplicates are brute. 
For, on the account we have developed, an explanation can be given as to why these 
di#erences obtain. Persons and person-parts di#er in kind. Persons are the kind of 
thing that can be conscious, person-parts are not. So even when a person-part has 
all the necessary microphysical properties for being conscious, it won’t be conscious 
for that reason. Only the person will be conscious in virtue of having those prop-
erties, since only the person meets the condition of being the right kind of thing. 
 On the proposed view, therefore, we can agree with Merricks that (MS) is false. 
But we can also avoid viewing consciousness as mysterious. When a person is con-
scious, this fact will be grounded in more basic microphysical facts. And when a 
person and a person-part that happen to be microphysical duplicates di#er in con-
sciousness, we can explain why this is so in terms of a prior di#erence in kind.  
 
).) A Simpler Account?  
 
One might wonder, at this juncture, whether the distinction between kinds and 
conditions is really necessary. Consider the following simpler account. To be con-
scious one has to be the right sort of thing. "erefore, when Mary is conscious, she 
is conscious partly in virtue of her microphysical profile, and partly in virtue of 
being the kind of thing she is. So even though Martha-Minus may have the right 
microphysical profile, it does not follow that she is conscious. In general, if x is F 
in virtue of being G and H, and y is also G, it does not follow that y must be F. So 
we can have a much simpler account on which rather than acting as conditions, 
kinds act instead as partial grounds of consciousness. Why not prefer this view?24 
 To answer this question, we need to look at a further objection about the pro-
posed picture. "e basic worry is that the proposed view has only shifted the bulge 
in the carpet. Originally, we wanted to explain how a person like Mary and a large 
person-part like Martha-Minus might di#er in consciousness, despite being micro-
physical duplicates. In answer to this explanatory challenge, we have appealed to a 
di#erence in kind. But now the di#erence in kind needs explaining. How, after all, 
could Mary and Martha-Minus be di#erent kinds of thing, given that they are mi-
crophysical duplicates? Is the kind-di#erence not just as mysterious and problem-
atic as the original di#erence in consciousness that we wanted to explain? 

24 "ere is, in fact, room for a version of my view on which kinds act as partial grounds. How-
ever, this version of the view still requires the machinery of conditional grounding if it is to avoid 
the kind of worry that we focus on in the next section. Cf. fn. &(. 
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 As we will see, to meet this challenge, we will need to argue that extrinsic dif-
ferences can underwrite the relevant di#erences in kind. In light of this, however, 
we will then face a challenge as to how consciousness could be intrinsic. Ultimately, 
I want to argue that this challenge can be met, but only if we treat the relevant 
kind-theoretic facts as conditions rather than as grounds. Accordingly, there is in 
fact principled reason to reject the simpler view sketched just above, and to prefer 
the view that draws a distinction between grounds and enabling conditions. "is 
will become clearer as we work through these issues in the following section.  
 
*  Kind-Di#erences, Maximality, and Intrinsicality  
 
On the account I have proposed, Mary and Martha-Minus di#er in kind, and this 
helps to explain why they di#er in consciousness. For concreteness, let us suppose 
that the relevant di#erence in kind is that only Mary is a person, where being a 
person is taken to be a background condition on being conscious. "e view is then 
that while Mary and Martha-Minus have the same consciousness-making micro-
physical properties, only Mary is conscious in virtue of having them, because the 
grounding relation holds conditionally, i.e. only given that Mary meets the condi-
tion of being a person. Since Martha-Minus fails to meet this condition, she fails 
to be conscious in virtue of having those same microphysical properties. 
 "ere is an important question as to how Mary and Martha-Minus could di#er 
in kind, given that they are microphysical duplicates. Moreover, this is especially 
so in light of the fact that a crucial part of the present project is the aim to preserve 
a plausible microphysicalist metaphysics, on which the facts about composite ob-
jects are grounded in underlying microphysical facts. In general, it is plausible to 
think that facts about what kind of thing an object is are not basic facts but are 
rather grounded in certain facts that are more basic.25 Within a microphysicalist 
framework, moreover, it will be plausible to think that kind-di#erences must be 
grounded in underlying microphysical di#erences. Mary and Martha-Minus, how-
ever, are microphysical duplicates. So how could these objects di#er in kind?  
 One option here would be to insist that kind-di#erences can be basic and thus 
ungrounded. Perhaps, when we specify what kind of thing a given object is, we say 
something about its nature, or its essence, and maybe facts about the nature or the 
essence of an object are not apt for metaphysical grounding (cf. Dasgupta &'!*). 
However, while such a view may be well worth taking seriously, it is not at all in 
the spirit of the kind of microphysicalist picture we are looking to preserve. Fortu-
nately, however, there is a better way. As it turns out, the di#erence in kind between 
Mary and Martha-Minus can be understood as grounded in underlying microphys-
ical di#erences, despite the fact that Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical 

25 "is is certainly so for macroscopic objects, such as human persons are on a materialist view 
(of the sort I have been presupposing here). Cf. Fine (&''%: !'+) on statues and pieces of clay.  
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duplicates. "is is because, for all that has been said, there might be extrinsic mi-
crophysical di#erences between Mary and Martha-Minus that are relevant to 
grounding the di#erence in personhood between them. 
 To say that Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical duplicates is to say that 
the atoms composing Mary are just like the atoms composing Martha-Minus in 
terms of both their individual intrinsic properties and their (restricted) atom-to-
tom relations (cf. section &). So, this guarantees that Mary and Martha-Minus do 
not di#er in terms of any intrinsic microphysical property. In general, the intrinsic 
microphysical properties of an object are a function of what the atoms composing 
them are intrinsically like. So, since the atoms composing Mary are intrinsically 
just like the atoms composing Martha-Minus, there is no room for Mary and Mar-
tha-Minus to di#er in terms of their intrinsic microphysical properties.26 
 However, it does not follow that there are no microphysical di#erences between 
Mary and Martha-Minus. In particular, there is still room for extrinsic microphys-
ical di#erences between them. After all, Mary and Martha-Minus are not micro-
physical duplicates in the strongest possible sense, i.e., it is not the case that the 
atoms composing Mary di#er neither intrinsically nor extrinsically from those com-
posing Martha-Minus. Accordingly, Mary and Martha-Minus can be said to have 
di#erent extrinsic microphysical properties. Moreover, as we will see, this is what 
will enable us to explain the di#erence in personhood between them. 
 In general, it is plausible to think that kind-properties such as personhood are 
maximal properties (cf. Sider &''!, &'')), where, roughly, a property F is maximal 
just in case the proper parts of Fs cannot be Fs (precisely by virtue of being proper 
parts of Fs). As Sider explains:  
 
Ordinary sortal predicates typically express maximal properties, where a property, F, 
is maximal, roughly, if large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. A large part of a 
house-all of the house save a window, say-does not itself count as a house. A large 
part of a cat—all of it save the tail, say—does not itself count as a cat. Otherwise in 
the vicinity of every house there would be a multitude of houses; in the vicinity of 
every cat there would be a multitude of cats…Maximality is a kind of border-sensi-
tivity: whether something counts as a house or cat depends on what is going on 
around its borders (&''): !)$)  

Maximal properties, however, are paradigmatic extrinsic properties. If being F is 
maximal, then whether x is F depends, at least in part, on x’s surroundings, and in 
particular, on whether x is embedded within a larger being that is itself an F. "us, 
if personhood is maximal, then personhood is also extrinsic. Whether a thing is a 
person will depend, at least in part, on whether that thing is embedded within 
something that is a person. 

26 I am assuming, here as throughout, that micro-based properties of the form being composed 
of atoms with such and such intrinsic properties and interrelations are themselves intrinsic. After all, 
such properties are a function of what the atoms composing an object are intrinsically like. For 
some interesting complications here, however, see [omitted].  
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 How does this help with the explanatory challenge that we are concerned with? 
Suppose that being a person is intrinsic. If, in general, the intrinsic features of objects 
are grounded in underlying intrinsic microphysical properties, as per (MG), then 
it would follow that there must be some intrinsic microphysical property MI such 
that Mary is a person in virtue of having MI. But then Martha-Minus will also have 
MI, since Martha-Minus is an (intrinsic) microphysical duplicate of Mary. But then 
the worry clearly emerges that Martha-Minus must also be a person in virtue of 
having MI. For, why should only Mary be conscious in virtue of having this micro-
physical property?  
 Of course, one could try to push back here just as we did before, namely, by 
utilising the machinery of conditional grounding and arguing that only Mary gets 
to be a person in virtue of having M*. However, we would then face the challenge 
of specifying some relevant di#erence between Mary and Martha-Minus that 
would explain why the grounding relation only obtains in Mary’s case. But then 
the problem would just re-emerge: unless the relevant di#erence were brute, the 
fact that Mary and Martha-Minus are microphysical duplicates would put pressure 
on the idea that the relevant di#erence obtains. Accordingly, we must pursue a 
di#erent strategy if we are to account for the kind-di#erence between Mary and 
Martha-Minus. 
 Fortunately, as we have seen, what we can do is abandon the idea that being a 
person is an intrinsic matter. Instead, we can maintain that personhood is extrinsic. 
Given this assumption, a plausible microphysicalist metaphysic will ensure that 
Mary is a person partly in virtue of having some extrinsic microphysical property 
ME.  However, there is no guarantee that Martha-Minus must also have this prop-
erty. In fact, since personhood is maximal, we have reason to deny that Martha-
Minus will instantiate ME.  For having ME will then involve, at least in part, being 
composed of atoms that are not embedded within a larger plurality of atoms com-
posing a person. But clearly, while the atoms composing Mary meet this condition, 
those composing Martha-Minus do not. "erefore, only Mary has the grounding 
property ME, and hence the argument for thinking that Martha-Minus must also 
have this property and must therefore also be a person is undermined. 
 In short, if we view personhood as maximal, and hence extrinsic, we can main-
tain that Mary and Martha-Minus di#er in personhood without having to deny 
that kind-di#erences are grounded in underlying microphysical di#erences. "is 
view, however, does raise at least one further question. Recall that our original aim 
was to explain how we can accept Merricks’ argument against (MS) without having 
to accept the untoward consequences regarding consciousness that it is widely taken 
to imply. And recall that this involves granting that consciousness is an intrinsic 
property. "e question now is whether the account we’ve ended up with really is 
consistent with taking consciousness to be intrinsic. After all, on the proposed view, 
a part of what explains why Mary is conscious is the fact that she is a person. But 
to explain why Mary is a person, we must appeal to extrinsic factors. Accordingly, 
 &' 
extrinsic factors seem to end up relevant to explaining why Mary is conscious. Yet 
that appears to threaten the idea that consciousness is an intrinsic property.  
 It is at this point that we can appreciate the importance of the earlier appeal to 
conditional grounding, and the idea that kind-membership-facts as background 
conditions on being conscious rather than grounds of consciousness. For it is this 
that will allow us to maintain that despite depending on extrinsic facts involving 
kind-membership for its instantiation, consciousness is nonetheless intrinsic.  
 Consider once again fact that Mary is conscious. Suppose we said that Mary is 
conscious partly in virtue of having intrinsic microphysical property MI, and partly 
in virtue of being an object of kind K (e.g. a person), where being a K is an extrinsic 
matter. In that case, we could no longer say that being conscious is intrinsic. After 
all, intrinsic properties are properties that are always had intrinsically, and that are 
never had extrinsically (cf. Bader &'!)).27 However, if Mary is conscious at least in 
part in virtue of having some extrinsic kind-property, then Mary instantiates con-
sciousness extrinsically, not intrinsically. Consciousness would thus turn out to be 
extrinsic, rather than intrinsic.  
 On the view I am recommending, however, Mary is not conscious, even in part, 
in virtue of instantiating some extrinsic kind-property. Rather, the view implies 
that Mary is conscious solely and fully in virtue of instantiating the intrinsic mi-
crophysical property, ME. "e role of the kind-property is that of background con-
dition: Mary is conscious in virtue of having M only on the condition that she is 
the kind of thing she is. Being that kind of thing, however, is not a part of what 
makes Mary conscious. Rather, being that kind of thing is what enables Mary to 
be conscious in virtue of instantiating the relevant intrinsic microphysical property. 
In light of this, I want to say, my account is fully compatible with viewing con-
sciousness as intrinsic.28   
 In making this claim, I am relying on something like the following principle: 
 

27 On the di#erence between (i) the local ‘intrinsically/extrinsically’, distinction, which distin-
guishes two ways a property can be had, and (ii) the global ‘intrinsic/extrinsic’ distinction, which 
distinguishes two second-order properties that properties can have, see Dunn (!$$': !%)) and 
Humberstone (!$$(: &'( & &&,—&&%).  
28 "ere is an alternate way of developing the kind of account I wish to defend here that does 
not have this consequence, on which we are to view kind-properties as both intrinsic and subject to 
maximality constraints. Suppose we said that when x is a person, x is a person solely in virtue of 
instantiating certain more basic intrinsic properties, but only on the condition that x is not a larger 
proper part of a person. On this view, we could maintain that maximal kind-properties like person-
hood are intrinsic: when a being instantiates one of these kinds, this will be in virtue of some par-
ticular set of intrinsic base properties, but the grounding relation will hold only given that the being 
in question meets certain maximality conditions.  Notably, such a view would also enable us to view 
kind-facts themselves partial grounds of consciousness—when x is conscious, the grounding relation 
would hold unconditionally, and the fact that x is the kind of thing she is would be a partial ground 
of her being conscious; however, the fact that x is the kind of thing she is would be conditionally 
grounded in certain microphysical properties whereby the condition is that the person meet a cer-
tain maximality constraint. "anks to [omitted] for discussion of this alternate view. 
 &! 
Intrinsicality: If x is F solely and fully in virtue of being G, and if G is in-
trinsic, then x has F intrinsically.   
 
"e idea is that for x to have a property intrinsically, it is su-cient for that property 
to have intrinsic grounds. And the crucial point is that on the account I am pro-
posing, this principle is not violated. Whenever a person is conscious, she is con-
scious only in virtue of intrinsic microphysical properties. And so whenever a per-
son is conscious, she has this property intrinsically. To be sure, the person instan-
tiates consciousness only given that she is the right kind of thing, and being that 
kind of thing is an extrinsic matter. However, extrinsic kind-facts do not enter into 
the grounds of consciousness, but rather function as background conditions. Ac-
cordingly, while there is a robust sense in which consciousness depends on extrinsic 
factors for its instantiation, this is no threat to the idea that consciousness is intrin-
sic, since it does not imply that consciousness is ever grounded in anything other 
than more basic intrinsic properties.29 
 "is point is important when it comes to appreciating the di#erence between 
the account developed here and those developed previously by Burke (&'')). Ac-
cording to Burke, consciousness itself is to be viewed as a maximal and hence as an 
extrinsic property. And so Merricks’ case against (MS) is undermined, and we are 
left with a way to explain why persons like Mary and person-parts like Martha-
Minus di#er in consciousness even despite being microphysical duplicates. "is 
maximality account, however, requires us to abandon the intuitive status of con-
sciousness as intrinsic. My own view, by contrast, appeals to maximality only when 
grounding the di#erence in kind between persons and person-parts. "erefore, 
since kinds are taken as conditions rather than grounds, the appeal to maximality 
made in this paper does not conflict with the intuitive idea that consciousness is 
intrinsic. I take this to constitute an important advantage over extant maximality 
accounts on which consciousness itself is taken to be maximal and thus extrinsic.  
 Sider (&'')), meanwhile, attaches maximality not to consciousness but to what 
he calls consciousness*. However, for Sider, x is conscious* i# x would be conscious 
were it not to fail to be a maximal conscious being. "at is, conscious* beings are 

29 One worry here is that this view conflicts with the plausible thought that intrinsic properties 
must be preserved across Lewisian duplicates. After all, so the thought goes, Mary and Martha-
Minus are surely such duplicates. So if consciousness is intrinsic, and yet Mary and Martha-Minus 
di#er in consciousness, then the intuitive idea that Lewisian duplicates must share intrinsics will be 
undermined. ("anks to [omitted] for raising this objection.) In reply, I’d want to make two points. 
First, it isn’t clear just what the cost is, in the present context, of denying that Lewisian duplicates 
can di#er in intrinsics. "is is, I think, no more surprising than the claim that microphysical dupli-
cates (in the sense of that term defined in section &) can di#er in consciousness, but this is also a 
crucial part of the account I wish to advocate. Moreover, the duplication account of intrinsicality is 
rather problematic (cf. Bader &'!)), and so questions arise about just how costly it is in general to 
deny that Lewisian duplicates never di#er in intrinsics. Second, it isn’t clear that we must grant that 
Mary and Martha-Minus are Lewisian duplicates in the first place. Indeed, if consciousness itself is 
a perfectly natural property, as it is not implausible to think, then Mary and Martha-Minus will not 
be Lewisian duplicates due to the di#erence in consciousness between them. 
 && 
just non-maximal conscious beings. So, if x is conscious*, then x still has a phe-
nomenology and hence overpopulation of beings with consciousness seems just as 
bad as overpopulation of beings with consciousness. "us, as Bader writes: 
 
Sider’s view leads to what we can call overpopulation*, namely the existence of vast 
numbers of overlapping beings that have a subjective mental life, that is, the over-
population by beings that are conscious*. As Merricks notes, Sider’s solution is only 
a semantic and not an ontological solution…His solution makes the claim that there 
is one conscious being in the vicinity come out true, but it does not enable us to 
avoid a commitment to overpopulation*. (Bader manuscript-a: &))30  
 
My strategy, therefore, is rather di#erent (and, I would say, much better). For, I 
attach the maximality constraint to the kind properties that persons have (whatever 
it may be, e.g., personhood, animality); I then make the instantiation of this kind 
a condition, rather than a ground, of being conscious. "is crucial move, moreover, 
of making the instantiation of the extrinsic kind by the person a condition rather 
than a ground, then prevents consciousness being extrinsic.  So, unlike Burke, we 
do not end up with consciousness as intrinsic. Moreover, since we do not attach 
maximality to consciousness* either or even introduce any such property, we do 
not end up with an overpopulation* problem, i.e., a problem of too many con-
scious* beings.31 
 A final thing worth mentioning is that my solution, unlike the Burke avoids 
the ‘irrelevant determiner’ objection (Bader manuscript-a; Merricks !$$%b, &''!). 
Suppose consciousness extrinsic. Still, it has to be extrinsic in a way that prevents 
the large undetached parts like Martha-Minus from being conscious. Yet one might 
worry that the mere fact that such a being is embedded in a larger conscious being 
is not the kind of extrinsic di#erence that ought to be able to make a di#erence. 
(Martha and Martha-Minus might have di#ered only by an atom or two after all). 
Maximality thus seems to lead to irrelevant determiners: factors that are intuitively 
irrelevant to consciousness yet mattering to whether a being is conscious or not. 
My view, however, avoids this. Maximality as a condition on kinds is well-moti-
vated, and even if x is a K and y is a non-K because y is embedded in a K and K’s 
are maximal, this leaves no analogue of the irrelevant determiner objection, because 
maximality does matter to kind-membership in a way that is just manifest (again 
cf. Sider &''!). We also avoid an analogue version of the objection Sider faces. So 
as to avoid overpopulation*, which he should, then he needs to make conscious-
ness* maximal as well, but then we get the irrelevant determiner objection again. 
Otherwise, consciousness* is non-maximal, so we do not get the irrelevant 

30 For or a similar criticism of semantic maximality see Jones (&'!': )%), who notes, quite 
rightly, that when we have ‘genuinely metaphysical problems…that wouldn’t have arisen had we 
used words di#erently and that can’t be resolved by a more nuanced conception of word- world 
relations—then semantic-maximality cannot help…’. Cf. also Merricks &''!, &''): !++-!+(). 
31 "anks to an anonymous reviewer for getting me to be much clearer on these points. 
 &) 
determiner objection, but we do get overpopulation*. Hard to say which horn is 
worse, or which option is harder to swallow. Better, as on my view, swallow neither. 
 
+  Conclusion 
 
"us, we have seen that it is possible to accept Merricks’ argument against (MS) 
without having to accept the problematic consequences involving consciousness 
that it is naturally taken to imply. If Merricks’ argument against (MS) is sound, 
then microphysical duplicates can di#er with respect to the intrinsic property of 
consciousness. However, we can accept this consistently with accepting (MG), the 
thesis that the intrinsic properties of complex objects are grounded in intrinsic mi-
crophysical properties. On the proposed view, when a person is conscious, she is 
conscious solely in virtue of instantiating certain intrinsic microphysical properties. 
However, this grounding relation holds only given that the person is a certain kind 
of thing. Any person-part that is a microphysical duplicate of that person, therefore, 
while instantiating those same (conditionally) consciousness-making microphysical 
properties, will not be conscious for that reason, whereby this is because the person-
part fails to meet the necessary background condition of being the right kind of 
object. 
 On this view, consciousness is no longer mysterious. "e consciousness facts 
are fully grounded in underlying microphysical facts. And di#erences in conscious-
ness between persons and large person-parts are explicable rather than being brute. 
Moreover, unlike extant reactions to Merrick’s case against (MS), the account de-
veloped here does not force us to reject our intuitive conception of consciousness 
as intrinsic, or to deny that human persons have large proper parts. "e account 
o#ered here, therefore, has a significant advantage over extant replies to Merricks’ 
argument. What is correct about that argument is respected, but the problematic 
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